Financial Analysis
TAM model, revenue structure, path to profitability, use of funds. Key metrics for board and investor conversations. Cross-reference with Intelligence section for Goldman Sachs forecasting analysis.
Total Addressable Market — Bottom-Up Model
Built from the ground up by identifying every segment where SC’s force plate + software platform is applicable. Methodology: segment size × realistic price points × penetration rate assumptions.
[source: bottom-up-tam-model.md, 2026-03-20 | confidence: medium]
| Segment | TAM | % of Total | Current Penetration | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Golf Tier 2 (Teaching Pros) | $212.8M | 30.2% | ~40%, declining | 29,000 PGA + 15,000 intl teaching pros. AxioForce ($14K bundle) targets this segment. Key growth opportunity. |
| Consumer / Home User | $136.5M | 19.4% | 0% | 500K US home simulator owners + 200K intl. Requires mobile app (Lane 1, Q4 2026 beta). Software-only — no hardware required. |
| Golf Tier 1 (Elite Academies) | $118.5M | 16.8% | ~85% | ~3,000 elite academies globally. SC already has majority of this segment. Limited upside; maintenance mode. |
| Golf Facilities (Ranges, Sims, Fitting) | $113.5M | 16.1% | <5% | ~37,500 facilities. Full Swing bundling deal is key unlock (see FSG model). 5,000 US indoor simulator facilities at $14K+. |
| New Verticals (Cricket, Tennis, S&C, Physio) | $71.5M | 10.1% | Near zero | ~3,500 facilities across cricket, tennis, athletics, elite team sports, sports medicine. Pipeline only — no current revenue. |
| NCAA Programs (Baseball + Golf) | $44.6M | 6.3% | ~15% | ~2,239 programs (D1/D2/D3 baseball + golf). Growing with baseball expansion. D1 college as feeder to MLB is a strong narrative. |
| Professional Baseball (MLB/MiLB) | $8.2M | 1.2% | 77% (MLB); <10% MiLB | 30 MLB teams at 77% penetration. 120 MiLB teams represent 4x the count. Highest willingness-to-pay; highest ROI case. |
| Professional Golf Tours | $3.4M | 0.5% | ~50+ ambassadors | PGA/LPGA/DP World tour players. Mostly via facility systems. Small TAM but high-visibility validation. |
| Grand Total TAM | $709M | 100% | ~0.6% | SC is at the very beginning of addressable market penetration |
Serviceable Available Market — Three Scenarios (5-Year)
| Scenario | Description | 5-Year SAM | Key Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | Realistic penetration, no new products | $84M | Golf Tier 1 at 50%, Tier 2 at 5%, MLB 90%, consumer 0.5% |
| Base Case | Product-market fit in Tier 2 + new verticals | $129M | Golf Tier 1 at 65%, Tier 2 at 12%, MLB 93%, consumer 2% |
| Optimistic | Dominant platform, multi-sport, mobile app success | $184M | Golf Tier 1 at 80%, Tier 2 at 20%, MLB 100%, consumer 5% |
[source: bottom-up-tam-model.md, 2026-03-20]
Revenue Model & Software Transition
The key investor narrative: SC is transitioning from a hardware company to a software platform with hardware-attach. This transition unlocks fundamentally different valuation multiples.
| Revenue Stream | 2022 Mix | 2025E Mix | Target Mix | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hardware | 79% | 51% | <50% | One-time; declining share as SaaS grows. Gross margin ~43%. Reframe as "data-capture infrastructure." |
| Software / SaaS | 21% | 49% | >50% | Recurring annual licenses. Gross margin 68%+. Drives valuation re-rating from hardware to software multiples. |
| Other (services, consulting) | ~0% | ~3% | Growing | Professional services, training, ambassador programs. |
Key Financial Metrics
[source: canonical-facts.yaml; financials.md; data room; 2026-03-20]
Path to Profitability
Three downsizing scenarios provide the board with a clear menu of options. Scenario B is the recommended path for a company actively fundraising.
| Metric | A: Minimal Viable | B: Lean Growth Recommended | C: Nuclear |
|---|---|---|---|
| Headcount (from 28) | 16 (cut 12) | 21 (cut 7) | 10 (cut 18) |
| Monthly personnel cost | 1,337 KNOK | 1,700 KNOK | 862 KNOK |
| Monthly net cash flow | +1,142 KNOK | +591 KNOK | +1,212 KNOK |
| Annual net cash flow | +13.7 MNOK | +7.1 MNOK | +14.5 MNOK |
| Severance (one-time) | ~2.9 MNOK | ~1.4 MNOK | ~5.4 MNOK |
| Cash-positive after severance | Month 4–5 | Month 3 | Month 5–6 |
| IPN grant (16 MNOK) preserved | YES | YES (fully) | NO — forfeit ~11 MNOK |
| Revenue trajectory | Flat | +10–15%/yr | −10–20%/yr decay |
| Investability | Moderate | Good | Destroyed |
Scenario B Recommendation Rationale
- Cash-flow positive immediately — buys unlimited runway without dilutive bridge capital.
- Preserves full IPN grant (16 MNOK) — worth more than the personnel cost of the people retained to service it.
- Retains growth capability — an investor will not fund a company that just fired half its team.
- 7 cuts are defensible: 3 are pure research (Atle, Jonatan, Richard), 2 are marketing roles replaceable by remaining team (Ingmar, Ehsan), 1 is de facto absent (Frida), 1 is a pre-revenue vertical (Vegard/MC).
- Severance is manageable (~1.4 MNOK), does not impair cash position fatally.
[source: downsize-to-profitability-model.md, 2026-03-22]
Use of Funds — $2M Bridge
6-month incremental spend above existing revenue. Every dollar produces evidence for the Series A. [source: use-of-funds.md, 2026-03-20]
| Category | Amount | % of Total | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| US Revenue Engine | $840K | 42% | 1 AE (golf Tier 2, $90K + $30K variable), 1 SDR ($65K + $25K variable), travel & demos ($75K), sales tooling ($20K), commissions ($50K), FSG deal acceleration ($20K). Do NOT hire VP Sales at $250K OTE — ramp risk too high. |
| Marketing & Distribution | $400K | 20% | 6–8 case studies ($60K), LinkedIn & Google demand gen ($90K), 2–3 targeted events ($80K), certification promotion ($30K), distributor enablement kits ($90K). No awareness plays — pipeline only. |
| Product & Partnerships | $350K | 18% | VCA MVP + Tier 2 readiness above grant-funded R&D ($250K), SDK/partnership legal (Wiersholm + US counsel, $100K). The 24 MNOK secured soft funding covers core R&D — this is the commercial product layer. |
| Buffer & Series A Prep | $410K | 20% | 2-month runway buffer ($350K, non-negotiable), financial audit + data room ($60K), US legal structuring, contingency. |
| Total | $2,000K | 100% | 42% goes to revenue-generating activities — what investors want to see |
Full Swing Bundling Opportunity — Revenue Impact
Full Swing Golf (FSG) tested SC camera + software in Toronto (positive result), recreating in Carlsbad showroom. FSG sells 100+ simulators/month. Back Nine Indoor Golf (exclusive FSG partner) adding 300+ franchise locations 2026–2027. If bundling proceeds, this is a capital-light revenue accelerant.
[source: fullswing-bundling-model.md | confidence: medium — no binding commitment exists yet]
| Scenario | Year 1 Total | Year 2 Total | Year 3 ARR (SW only) | Software Mix Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative (25% adoption, 25 units/mo) | $300K | $390K | $270K | Software from 26% → 29% of total |
| Base (50% adoption, 60 units/mo) | $720K | $936K | $648K | Software from 26% → 35% |
| Optimistic (75% adoption, 113 units/mo) | $1.35M | $1.755M | $1.215M | Software from 26% → 46% |
FSG — Key Facts for Investor Narrative
- FSG is Official Technology Partner of Tiger Woods’ TGL indoor golf league (ESPN/ABC)
- Back Nine Indoor Golf exclusive FSG partner: 100+ locations today → 400+ by 2027 (~1,800 new simulators)
- Keith Bank (KB Partners CEO, target SC investor) sits on the Full Swing board — commercial partnership and fundraising narratives are naturally aligned
- Camera hardware: ~$200 margin per unit — modest BOM cost (Hikvision OEM)
- OEM subscription: near-zero marginal cost per subscriber
- FSG SDK agreement: draft sent Sep 2025, CTO review in progress. Must be signed before bundling can proceed.
MLB ROI Case — Investor Narrative
The financial argument for why 23/30 MLB teams have already bought SC, and why the remaining 7 will eventually follow.
[source: mlb-roi-model.md, 2026-03-20]
If SC prevents one Tommy John surgery every three years (conservative), the return is 26x. Base case (one every two years): 42–58x. Every model of injury prevention ROI justifies the force plate investment by a wide margin. This is why 77% of MLB teams already own the platform.
Pitch narrative: "An MLB team invests $175M/year in player salaries but loses $33M to injuries. A single Tommy John surgery costs $3–6M. SC's force plate system costs $50K — less than a day of an average pitcher's salary — and provides the only technology that directly measures the ground reaction forces that drive arm stress. The question isn't whether force data prevents injuries. The question is why the last 7 teams haven't bought one yet."
Important Data Caveats
| Data Point | Caveat | Action Needed |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue $5.5M (2025E) | Cash receipts (57.98 MNOK), NOT audited revenue. Recognized revenue may differ due to timing of hardware shipments. | Confirm audited 2025 P&L with Erlend when available. |
| Cash position ~1.74 MNOK | March 2026 projected from liquidity model. Actual Q1 position unconfirmed. | Confirm with Erlend. Critical for board reporting. |
| Convertible loan 5.2 MNOK | Breakdown (4.7M principal + 0.5M interest?) unconfirmed. Thor Egil Five has details. | Confirm exact figure with Thor Egil before including in investor materials. |
| VCA grant soft funding "24 MNOK" | Conditional on maintaining staff and project progression. Losing key IPN personnel risks grant clawback. | Monitor IPN personnel in any downsizing scenario. Scenario B preserves all critical grant personnel. |
| Gross margin 48–50% | From data room financial model. Not traced to audited accounts. | Request auditor-reviewed gross margin from Thor Egil / Erlend for data room. |
[source: canonical-facts.yaml — review caveat fields]
Also see: Intelligence Section → for Goldman Sachs forecasting analysis and market comparables.
Fundraising Strategy →